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IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL USER FEE SYSTEM: A 
STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE 
 




Since the implementation of the Environemental User Fee System (EUFS) in the 
Laguna de Bay Region in 1997, there has been no comprehensive evaluation of its 
impacts particularly at the regulated firm level. This study, therefore, is an attempt to 
generate empirical evidence that could explain the differential behavior of regulated 
firms toward the EUFS. The emphasis of analysis is at the firm level, since firms are 
crucial stakeholders whose cooperation spells the difference between pollution or non-
pollution, or between acceptable levels of pollution and excessive levels. 
The sources of information for this study include: a) a survey of 89 firms 
regularly monitored by the Laguna Lake Development Auhtority (LLDA) from 1999-
2004; b) 170 firms with  self-monitoring reports (SMRs) for 2002 and environmental 
performance indicators for 1999-2004; and c)  dissemination seminars for firms and the 
regulator.  
Using a conceptual framework modified from Doonan, et al. (2002), 
environmental performance is modeled (using the EQS 6.1 Build 88) as a series of 
events wherein different sources of pressure induce firms to undertake activities and 
actions which subsequently affect the firms’ environmental performance. Compliance 
rate (%) to the standard of 50 mg/li Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) was used as a  
measure of ernvironmental performance.  
Firms perceive that governments, in general, are the main source of pressure for 
pollution abatement. Clients and the EUF are the second and third important source of 
pressure, respectively. Statistical analysis and data trends for the surveyed  89 firms and 
the 170 firms showed that in general, the EUFS has been successful in inducing firms to 
improve their environmental performance. This is specifically reflected by the 
decreasing trends in the average EUF and variable fees paid as well as in the  BOD 
loading and concentration  over the period 1999-2004. More importantly, 75% of the 89 
sample firms are not simply complying with the standard but are actually, on average, 
performing 80% better than the standard. Other impacts include reduction in the volume 
of wastewater discharges; installation of wastewater treatment facilities; and reduction, 
substitution or elimination of harmful chemicals in response to the regulation.  
Given the above findings, the good news is that firms have responded positively 
to the EUFS. The bad news is, it is a very costly response that makes the regulated firms 
less competitive. Compliance rates can be further improved and compliance costs can 
be potentially reduced. Entry points for policy intervention include a restructuring of the 
user fees, provision of information on the more appropriate abatement technology, and 





IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL USER FEE SYSTEM: A 
STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE 
 




Laguna de Bay is the Philippines’ largest lake and Southeast Asia’s second 
largest freshwater lake with a total surface area of 900 sq. kms. (Nepomuceno, 2004). 
To date, environmental protection is being accorded to the lake owing to the crucial 
economic benefits such as being an important source of domestic water supply and 
fishery activities. These benefits, however, are threatened by water pollution arising 
from rapid urbanization and industrialization. Thus, in 1997, the LLDA embarked on 
the use of a market based instrument - the Environmental User Fee System (EUFS) - 
which was introduced in the Laguna de Bay Region by the Laguna Lake Development 
Authority (LLDA). The direct impact of an environmental user charge is on the 
behavior of the economic agent to whom the charge is assessed. The heart of pollution 
abatement behavior is at the level of the firm. From such behavior, the desired effects 
on environmental quality can be deduced. Since the implementation of this pollution 
charge program that was initiated to complement the existing command and control 
regulatory approach, there has been no comprehensive evaluation of its impacts 
particularly at the regulated firm level. Although various reengineering studies have 
been commissioned in the past, (SDLBEP, no date; Tetra Tech EM, Inc., 2001) such 
studies mainly focused on the improvement of regulatory instruments and approaches 
(e.g., refinement and expansion of the EUFS coverage) and the strengthening of 
LLDA’s policy and planning functions (Korea Environment Institute, 2004 as cited 
inLISCOP Final Inception Report, 2004). Thus, it may be said that the inclination of 
past studies in the light of assessing the impact of the EUF has generally been toward 
the traditional “top-to-bottom” approach.  
This paper asserts the importance of conducting an evaluation of the same 
market-based instrument but from the viewpoint of an important stakeholder, the 
regulated firms. The value of this study lies in generating empirical evidence that could 
explain the differential behavior of regulated firms toward the environmental user fee. 
Regulatory agencies like the LLDA will certainly benefit from information and analysis 
that sheds more light as to why some firms undertake various levels of investment on 
pollution abatement measures in response to the implementation of the pollution charge 
while others do not. In addition, LLDA stands to gain from knowing what works and 
what does not work for polluting firms that induce them to internalize negative 
externalities they create or persist to engage in environmentally damaging behavior. 
Results from this study will also serve as valuable input to LLDA’s current thrust of 








 2.0  RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Laguna de Bay is the Philippines’ largest lake and Southeast Asia’s second 
largest freshwater lake with a total surface area of 900 sq. kms. Intensified 
environmental protection accorded to the lake stems from crucial economic benefits that 
includes being an important source of domestic water supply and fishery incomes. Such 
benefits, however, are threatened to be eroded by water pollution arising from rapid 
urbanization and industrialization. An estimated 4 million metric tons of suspended 
solids flow into the lake, with an average accretion of 0.5 cm per year (Nepomuceno, 
2004). Pollution from industries accounts for about 21% of the total organic loading 
into the lake and since 1970, industries have grown by as much as five-fold.  
In response to the need to curb further water quality deterioration, the LLDA, in 
1997,  embarked on the use of a market based instrument (MBI) - the Environmental 
User Fee System (EUFS)- which was introduced in the Laguna de Bay Region. The 
EUFS is actually a “model of mixed regulatory and economic instrument for pollution 
prevention and abatement in the context of lake/river basin management (Nepomuceno, 
2004).  The only pollutant for which regulation was made is the biochemical oxygen 
demand or BOD loading. The annual user fee consists of a fixed fee that covers 
administrative costs of the program and a variable fee that is based on BOD loading. 
According to LLDA records, there are about 2,890 establishments in the Laguna 
de Bay Region which are classified as ‘wet’ industries that can be potentially covered 
by the system. As of July 2004, the coverage of the EUFS, however, has been limited to 
only 1,340 firms because the rest are considered “exempted” since those firms have 
average discharge flows that are below the legal minimum of 12 cu.m for which 
regulations have been set. During the first three years of implementing the EUFS, the 
ratio of actual collection to total assessed fees  (or the collection efficiency) was only 
50% on average. The large volume of transactions could not be processed efficiently 
with the limited monitoring, assessment and billing system (LISCOP Final Inception 
Report, 2004). With its regular implementation from the fourth year onwards, the total 
number of firms covered by LLDA was 914 as of December 2002. BOD loading into 
the lake is said to have significantly decreased from 1997 to 2002. This was attributed 
by LLDA to a host of factors that include the setting up/upgrading of treatment 
facilities, wastewater recycling activities, adoption of waste minimization strategies and 
voluntary closure or plant relocation.   Incidences of dilution among firms, however, 
were reported. (Nepomuceno, 2004).  
Since the implementation of the EUFS in 1997, there has been no 
comprehensive evaluation of its effectiveness particularly at the industry or firm level. 
Although various reengineering studies have been commissioned by LLDA in the past, 
(LISCOP Final Inception Report, 2004; SDLBEP, no date; Tetra Tech EM, Inc., 2001) 
such studies largely focused on the improvement of regulatory instruments and 
approaches (e.g., refinement and expansion of the EUFS coverage) and the 
strengthening of LLDA’s policy and planning functions (Korea Environment Institute, 
2004 as cited in LISCOP Final Inception Report, 2004). Thus, it can be said that the 
direction and approach of past assessment studies had generally been from “top-to 
bottom”.  
In the light of LLDA’s mandate “to promote and accelerate the balanced 





management and control”, it will serve an equally important purpose to be able to elicit 
empirical information and analysis on the response of firms to this environmental 
regulation. Gaining their insights and perceptions about the effectiveness and 
implementation of the EUFS will prove quite useful inputs in LLDA’s current thrust of 
further refining and improving this economic instrument.   
Given the foregoing, it is but timely and relevant to ask: What have been the 
impacts of the user fee on the environmental performance of regulated industries?  How 
effective a regulatory instrument has been in inducing changes in the pollution 
abatement behavior of firms over time? What are the various sources of pressure that 
regulated firms face in improving their environmental performance? Is the EUF a source 
of pressure? 
This paper is, thus, an attempt to provide useful insights to the above queries. 
The emphasis of analysis is at the firm level, since firms are crucial stakeholders whose 
cooperation spells the difference between pollution or non-pollution, or between 
acceptable levels of pollution and excessive levels. 
3.0 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
3.1  Use of Market-Based Instruments 
 
Economic instruments such as emission and effluent charges are said to be the 
most commonly used in developing and transition countries. But more often than not, 
these charges have been set at quite low levels, and with the unsystematic enforcement 
of such instruments, the result has been such that they did not really have much impact 
on the behavior of polluting firms. Neither were they effective enough in raising 
revenues, with the exception of Poland’s case. (World Bank Group, 1998). In a study of 
Zagreb on the policies and trends of water pricing in Croatia, a recent assessment 
carried out by Hrvatske vode experts (a government agency for water management) 
indicated that the present fee is four times lower than the actual costs of waste water 
motivating the polluter to maintain the status quo, rather than invest in new waste water 
treatment plants. On the other hand, success factors for the water pollution charge in the 
Netherlands and sulfur tax in Sweden include, among other things,  a) setting charges or 
taxes at high enough levels to provide for full cost recovery of  treatment; b) using a 
charge base (e.g., BOD and heavy metal pollution for water pollution charge) that is 
directly linked to pollution load of large firms;  c) decentralizing the charge program  
and making it transparent for water and air users; d) setting transparent rebate scheme to 
strengthen incentive effects of taxation and e) easy implementation  and low 
administrative costs, with burden of proving actual emissions level imposed on polluters 
(Opschoor et al., 1994 as cited in World Bank Group, 1998).    
Baumol and Oates (1988) state that, theoretically, emission charges are the best 
way to alter the behavior of economic agents and internalize the social costs of pollution 
if they are set at levels equal to the marginal environmental damage or marginal 
abatement costs. Furthermore, the ultimate level of effluent charges should be high 
enough as to “provide an incentive for a targeted level of pollution abatement within an 






In the real world, however, there may be constraints to the effective 
implementation of user charges. Unless the enabling macroeconomic and environmental 
policy framework are in place, the success of pollution charges would be a remote 
possibility. Where output markets are distorted to the extent that polluters who have 
monopoly power can pass the costs of abatement on to consumers and when there is no 
pressure to adopt alternative solutions, user charges can be rendered ineffective. 
Markets for environmental services that offer alternative options must also be well-
developed; it is unfortunate, though, that such is not the usual case in the domestic 
markets of developing countries. General economic and political stability is also an 
important enabling factor for the effectiveness of pollution charges. Lastly, 
environmental regulatory agencies must have the institutional capacity and the will to 
enforce regulations, with strong legal and political support as well as consensus among 
major stakeholders. The major stakeholders referred to are the environmental agencies, 
the industries subject to the pollution charges, and the communities that are affected by 
the pollution. The awareness and participation by the public and community pressures 
through NGOs can also be a powerful enforcement tool. The long-term success of 
economic instruments also needs “systematic measurement of their performance, either 
through self-examination or through external oversight” as these can provide the 
necessary feedback (World Bank Group, 1998).   
Qinghong Pu (2003) evaluated the effectiveness of existing pollution control 
strategies in the Yangtze Region and explored the strategies that can effectively control 
industrial water pollution in the Yangtze River. He found out that although the current 
pollution control strategies and informal forces have jointly produced a positive water 
pollution control outcome in the Yangtze River, there is still considerable room for 
promoting their effectiveness. His paper suggested developing the integration of 
strategies that emphasize the synergy of command-and controls, market-based 
instruments and informal instruments and the cooperation of government, communities 
and polluters. 
In their paper which investigated the enforcement and effectiveness of China’s 
pollution levy system, using factory- level data of 3,000 firms, Wang and Wheeler 
(1999) found that there is considerable scope in the use of economic instruments to 
improve the problem of industrial pollution in China. In their study, the factors that 
significantly affected both water and air pollution charges include ambient quality and 
plant characteristics. State-owned plants pay less but large, old firms and those with 
positive profit pay high levy rates. Across industry sectors, building materials and paper 
have low water levies in contrast to petroleum production. Citizen complaints have a 
positive significant impact on air pollution levy but not on water levy. The air levy’s 
greater impact is through the production process adjustment while that for water levy 
was through the end-of pipe abatement.  
In the paper of Allen Blackman (2005), which looked at Columbia’s discharge 
fee system, he found that that the program has been beset by a number of serious 
problems such as (1) limited implementation in many regions, (2) widespread 
noncompliance by municipal sewage authorities, and (3) a confused relationship 
between discharge fees and discharge standards. Nevertheless, pollution loads dropped 
significantly after the program was introduced in several watersheds. While proponents 
of Columbia’s discharge fees program claim the incentives that discharge fees created 
for polluters to cut emissions in a cost-effective manner were responsible for this 





improve permitting, monitoring, and enforcement, by enhancing transparency and 
accountability and by creating financial incentives for strict enforcement, were at least 
as important. 
 
On the other hand, the U.S. EPA findings of the Industrial Pollution Prevention 
Project (IP3) cited four general motivators as most important for pollution prevention in 
industries, namely: 1) economics; 2) technical and financial assistance; 3) open 
communication; and 4) flexibility (“especially regulatory flexibility”). The key factor 
triggering pollution prevention is stringent regulation with enforcement action. 
Industries desire to avoid being subject to regulations (EPA, 1995). Compliance to 
environmental regulations is also perceived to enhance the company’s public image and 
protect public health, thus, serving as an important driver for industrial pollution 
prevention (Shen, 2000). 
 
3.2  Determinants of Environmental Performance 
 
Magat and Viscusi (1990) made an empirical analysis of the impact of U.S. EPA 
inspections on the discharges of the pulp and paper industry in the U.S. and found that 
inspections served as deterrents against non-compliance.  
Hua Wang (2000) evaluated the degree of influence of community pressure and 
pollution charge on industrial pollution control in China. An industrial organic water 
pollution discharge model was constructed and estimated using Chinese data on plant-
level organic water pollution from those industrial plants violating discharging 
standards. This model includes both formal and informal (community) regulations. The 
results of the estimation affirmed that both formal and informal (community) variables 
are indeed significant determinants of the water pollution discharge behavior. 
Furthermore, it was seen through a conservative estimation that both formal and 
informal regulations are almost of the same strength. The study was also able to prove 
that Chinese pollution levy system has been quite effective in providing incentives for 
most industries which are violating water pollution discharge standards.  
The environmental performance of firms is strongly influenced by both internal 
and external pressures.  In his theory of rational crime, Gary Becker (1968 as cited by 
Nyborg and Telle (n.d.) stated that a profit-maximizing firm will comply with an 
environmental regulation only as long as the expected penalty of violating exceeds the 
compliance cost. There have been disputes about the impact of monitoring and 
enforcement on compliance of polluting firms. Harrington’s analysis of monitoring, 
enforcement and compliance with environmental regulations in the US in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s suggested that compliance is higher than predicted by standard theory.   
Nyborg and Telle (n.d.) however, claims that there is lack of evidence from other 
studies to confirm what has been labeled as the “Harrington paradox”.  
Recent studies attempted to determine the factors which hinder the successful 
compliance to environmental policies promoting the adoption of clean technologies. 
Corral (n.d.) analyzed the determinants of a firm’s willingness to adopt or develop 






determinants according to the frequency and degree of importance given to the factors 
mentioned. 
The first group is composed of factors arising from social norms. These include 
public and shareholder pressures, regulations enforcement, market demand, community 
concerns, customer demands, liability, public image and social responsibility, etc. The 
second set of factors is cognitive and attitudinal such as perceptions, personality, 
efficacy, leadership, and environmental awareness and the ethics of managers and 
CEOs. Other factors included in this group are economic efficiency and opportunity, 
and the risk and uncertainty of the innovative process. Lastly, the third group involves 
the technological factors believed to hamper the “greening” of industry. Recurrent 
factors include the lack of technological opportunities and the necessity of generating a 
new knowledge base prior to attaining a sustainable industrial development; the 
industrial and trade relationships across the supply chain; the relation between end-users 
and suppliers; the firms’ technological and organizational endowments; technological 
trajectories, etc.(Corral, 2001). Many as they are, only a few of these studies were 
quantitative in nature. 
Using the theory of social change as basis and a case study of the In-Bond 
industry (Maquila), Corral 2001 tested the relationship between the willingness of a 
firm to innovate/adopt clean technologies and three sets of determinants: attitude 
towards innovation, social pressure and control over innovation.  
The firm’s attitude (A) toward the development of cleaner technologies is 
defined as the degree to which the firm’s manager expects good or bad outcomes from 
the performance of such behavior. The firm’s perceived social pressure (PSP) refers to 
the importance that the firm’s manager gives to different important referents. Lastly, the 
firm’s perceived control over the development of cleaner technologies (PC) focuses on 
the management beliefs about how much control their organization can exert over the 
innovation process to develop cleaner technologies. 
The determinants of the firm’s attitude toward the development of cleaner 
technologies are the environmental and economic risks perceived by the managers. On 
the other hand, the determinants of social pressure include environmental regulations, 
industrial standards (ISO), market position, market forces, customer expectations and 
demands, and public concerns. These can be summarized as the regulatory regime, the 
market pressures, and the perceived lobbying capacity of the community. As for the 
determinants of the perceived control, these include organizational learning (OL), 
strategic alliance (AL), networks of collaboration (NWK), and technological 
capabilities (TC). 
Among the determinants, the technological capabilities (39.8%) and the 
perceived economic risk (21.38%) accounted for the major part of the variance in the 
willingness to innovate.  However, these factors are moderated by the perceived control 
over innovation i.e. the higher the capabilities, the lower the perceived economic risk 
and the higher the willingness. The  results suggested that optimal policy scenarios arise 
only from high technological capacities of firms  and that high social pressure  to 
develop clean technologies are not sufficient to motivate firms to innovate. The results 
further suggest that there are better ways of promoting better environmental 





Contrary to Corral’s (2001) conclusions, Doonan, et al. (2002)  asserts the 
crucial role of strong government regulatory intervention as  exerting pressure on  firms 
to improve their environmental performance.  Their findings are based on a survey of 
101 environment directors of pulp and paper plants in Canada. 
Using results from the survey, the authors developed a linear structural equation 
model in which the exogenous and endogenous variable are proxied by a series of 
observed indicators combined through principal component analysis.  
The authors grouped the various sources of pressure into four categories: legal, 
economic, social, and internal. The nature of the environmental regulation faced by the 
enterprises is the legal source of pressure. This would include both the stringency and 
extent of implementation of the regulation. The economic source of pressure includes: 
providers of financial capital (investors and creditors); customers; suppliers; and 
competitors. Community and non-governmental organizations represent the social 
sources of pressure. Finally, the management and the employees serve as the internal 
sources of pressure. 
These sources of pressure for the firms are forcing them to undertake several 
actions to improve their environmental performance. These actions, like the sources of 
pressure, are also grouped into five broad categories. First is involvement, which refers 
to the level of involvement of top  management in the environmental affairs of the 
company. Second is integration, which represents the level of integration between the 
environmental services and the other administrative units of the industrial facility. Third 
are the human resources, which capture how human resources management takes into 
account environmental issues. Fourth is the financial resource, which refers to the 
physical and financial resources devoted to the improving and maintaining of the 
environmental performance of the facility. Last is the monitoring system, which 
represents the facility’s environmental performance monitoring activities and system.  
On the other hand, environmental performance of the industrial facility was 
measured using six variables. These are BOD and TSS effluent emissions, spills, use of 
chlorine, fines and penalties, air emissions, and the use of alternative sources of energy. 
Results of the analysis showed that the three most important sources of pressure 
perceived by the environmental directors are the government, the general public and the 
higher level of management. Their findings are consistent with those of Deschamps and 
Beaulieu (1996) who assert that the environmental involvement of top management is a 
primary determinant of environmental performance.  
It was also noted that the way in which environmental issues are taken into 
account in human resources management also influences environmental performance 
through its impact on the level of integration.  This result is consistent with that of 
Boiral and Dagupta, et al (1997) who associated the level of environmental training 
with better environmental performance. 
 
The level of integration between the environmental services and the other 
administrative units had an indirect effect on the environmental performance through its 
impact on the monitoring system and the financial resources devoted to the 
environment.  The environmental performance monitoring system has an indirect 
impact on environmental performance through its effect on the level of financial 





because in the paper industry, environmental performance relies on the use of extensive 
and expensive pollution abatement devices. 
While majority of studies analyzed the determinants of willingness to comply, 
Corral (n.d.) recommends changing the focus of environmental policies towards 
determinants of resistance to behavioral change. Theories on self distribution and power 
assumes that self-interest (i.e. profit seeking) explains per se firms’ behavior towards 
compliance with regulations and development of clean technologies. These theories, 
however, do not explain the conditions under which incentive-based instruments 
designed to promote environmental protection could be implemented.  
Dissertation work on contested enforcement of the EUF was done by 
Montenegro (2006). She made use of monthly water pollution discharges from panel 
data from 1997-2004 of 16 beverage and pulp and paper mills regulated by the LLDA. 
Her data were taken from the quarterly self-monitoring reports (SMRs) submitted by 
firms to LLDA. The main objective of her study was to undertake an empirical analysis 
of how contested enforcement impacts firms’ environmental performance. Contested 
enforcement here is proxied by the number of case dismissals plus other legal 
enforcement actions . Using a single-equation random effects model, she found that the 
significant factors that positively affected levels of BOD and TSS were compliance 
cost, firm size and existence of pulping processes. Lagged enforcement and inspection 
variables had no significant effect on environmental performance. However, 
enforcement intensity significantly influenced the levels of BOD and TSS. 
 
4.0 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
4.1 General Objective 
To analyze the impact of the environmental user fee on industries’ 
environmental performance, from firms’ own perspective.  
4.2 Specific Objectives 
To provide an historical background on the institution and mechanics of the 
environmental user fee system (EUFS);  
To analyze the sources of pressure and other factors that enhance or limit the 
firms’ environmental performance; 
5.0 RESEARCH METHODS 
5.1 Research Questions to be Answered 
From the point of view of firms, what have been the impacts of the user fee on 





How effective a regulatory instrument has been in inducing changes in the 
pollution abatement behavior of firms? What are the other determinants of pollution 
abatement behavior of firms?  
What are the sources of pressure that influence firms’ environmental 
performance? 
What courses of action have firms made in response to the EUFS?  
 
5.2 Hypotheses of the Study 
The EUFS is an effective instrument for inducing changes in pollution 
abatement behavior of regulated firms.  
Various sources of pressure directly affect environmental performance. 
The commitment of top level management is a significant determinant of firms’ 
environmental performance. 
Investment on physical and human capital increases the firms’ compliance rate. 
The level of firms’ monitoring activities positively affect compliance rate. 
5.3 Sampling Procedure  
To be able to generate emprical evidence and analyze the impact of the EUFS 
on pollution abatement behavior of regulated industries, the study initially set out to 
survey 150 firms, randomly selected from a population of 177 stand-alone industrial 
firms that LLDA regularly monitored from 1999-2004. Although the present count of 
LLDA-monitored firms is already more than a thousand, it is strongly believed that this 
group of 177 firms that had been regularly monitored in the last six years are in the best 
position to talk about how the user charge has affected them. From this population, a  
stratification was done based  on a) the type of industry subsector  and  b) the volume of 
wastewater discharge. The survey of firm managers and/or pollution control officers 
was done from November 2005 to May 2006. Some respondents preferred to be 
interviewed face to face. For the majority of the firms, however, the survey instrument 
was dropped off and collected some weeks after. The focus was only on industrial 
sectors that faced the EUF and had to pay the EUF. A toal of 89 firms (or a response 
rate of 50%) have responded to our survey and they constitute the final sample used in 
this study.  
5.4 Other Sources of Data 
The field survey is important and useful for eliciting descriptive information on 
the perceptions of the regulated firms with regard to the impacts of the EUFS. It also 
provides qualitative assessment of the sources of pressure that are perceived by firms to 







However, because of the cross-section nature of the field survey, not much trend 
and other quantitative analysis of the EUFS impact can be done. To complement the 
survey, firm-level time series data (1999-2004) on the wastewater discharge, BOD and 
EUF of 270 firms were accessed from LLDA. Another set of data accessed for analysis 
was the self-monitoring reports (SMRs) for the year 2002
1. The information contained 
in the SMRs were intended to be used as basis for characterizing and differentiating 
compliant firms from non-compliant firms.  
5.5 Conceptual Framework 
Environmental performance is modeled as a series of events wherein different 
sources of pressure induce firms to undertake activities and actions which subsequently 
affect the firms’ environmental performance (Doonan et al 2002) . The details of this 





















Figure 1.    Conceptual Framework Modified from Doonan et al. (2002) 
 
Pressures can be proxied by the ranking of managers of impact of each source of 
pressure. Sources of pressure are latent exogenous variables that may be proxied by 
some other indicators and combined using principal component analysis . For instance, 
legal pressures that refer to influence of enforced regulations on firms’ environmental 
practices can be measured, among other things, by the number of regulatory inspections 
as well as by the number of compliance violations and enforcement actions taken 
against the firm. Economic pressures which capture the influence of providers of 
financial capital (e.g., investors and creditors, customers, suppliers and competitors)   
can be measured by a) customers’ consideration of environmental management in 
selecting suppliers; b) market outlet (export or domestic); c) perceived competitors’ 
adoption of environmental services; d) industry associations; e) market share of each 
industry; f) type of good sold (intermediate or final good); and g) market concentration. 
Social pressure is represented by the influence of communities, environmental interest 
groups and non-government organizations and may be measured by a) the number of 
community complaints against the firm; b) proxy for propensity for collective action 
such as voter turnout in recent elections; c) demographics such as average household 
income and population density; d) community environmental activism as represented by 
proportion of population proximate to each firm. Internal  sources of pressure is 
captured by influence of management and employees characteristics and can be 
measured by a) ownership of firm (% equity, whether foreign, private or government); 
                                                 
1 The more recent SMRs could not be accessed since LLDA was using them as basis for assessing the 









b) legal classification of firm (single proprietorship, partnership, private or public 
corporation, multinational); c) firm listing in stock market; d) market leadership/market 
share; e) brand reputation of parent company; f) and existence of employees’ unions. 
The ways in which environmental managers perceive the various sources of 
pressure discussed above will have some impact on the attitudes and lines of action 
taken by the firms with regard to improving environmental performance. These attitudes 
and actions are thus grouped into five categories. Involvement of top management in the 
environmental affairs of the firm can be represented by the existence of high position 
for environmental concerns and inclusion of a seat in the board of directors fro an 
environmnet committee. Integration between environmental services and the various 
administrative units of the firms can be probed by asking questions on a) the existence 
of  EMS; b) joint employer-employee committee on environmental issues; c) firms’ 
intention to secure ISO 14000 certification; d)frequency of contact between 
environment director and managers of other units; e) consideration of environmental 
issues in making major changes or plans in the firm; and f) involvement of employees in 
the formulation and discussion of  environmental policy. Human resources capture how 
personnel management considers environmental issues This can be indicated by the 
provision of environmental training across types of employees and consideration of 
environmental performance in the compensation package and performance evaluation of 
employees. Financial resources represent the physical and financial resources allotted 
to improving and maintaining environmental performance such as information on 
budget and personnel devoted to research on environmental issues within the firms,  
budget and number of people assigned to environmental services, existence of 
secondary treatment systems, etc. Monitoring system represents the facility’s 
environmental performance monitoring system and activities. It can be measured by the 
number of external environmental audits, extent to which these external audits’ 
recommendations are followed and the existence of chemical risk assessment if 
applicable. 
In turn, the aforementioned activities will have some bearing on the actual 
environmental performance of the industrial facility, which, in this case will be 
measured by the BOD compliance rate measured as, 
                             Actual BOD – BOD standard  x 100 
                                        BOD standard 
Note that the value of the compliance rate will be negative if firms are compliant. 
5.6 Analytical Procedure: Simultaneous Equation Model 
Following from the conceptual framework in Figure 1, the general form of the 
estimating linear simultaneous equation model is given by: 
Y = ΓZ + Υβ + ε 
where: 
Y is a m x1 vector of latent endogenous variables 






Γ is a m x n matrix of coefficients to be estimated 
β is a m x n matrix of coefficeints to be estimated 
ε is a m x 1 vector of residual errors 
 
The EQS 6.1 (Build 88) software is used to estimate the above model. 
A principal component  analysis was first done to reduce the dimension of the 
relevant explanatory variables. This is a preparatory step towards the estimation of the 
simultaneous equation model of environmental performance. It is a useful tool 
considering the small sample size for the study. 
In keeping with the  standard rules, the factors were chosen using  the following 
criteria: a) the eigenvalues were larger than unity, b) individually they contribute to 
more than 10% of the variance in the data, and c) the cumulative contribution of the 
factors account for more than 60% of the variation in the data. For the estimation in the 
next section however, only the first facto r s  w e r e  u s e d  t o  avoid having too many 
variables in the simultaneous equations. Having too many variables and a small sample 
size can reduce the degrees of freedom of the estimation and thus, reduce the accuracy 
of the estimates. Furthermore, the factor loadings of each of the components of the 
factors were based on the rotated factor loadings obtained through the varimax method. 
The results of the PCA are shown in Appendix Tables 1-9. 
The constructed indices obtained from the PCA were then used in the regression 
analysis. 
6.0 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 The Environmental User Fee System (EUFS)
2 
6.1.1  Why It Was Imposed 
Laguna de Bay is considered as the largest inland body of water in the 
Philippines. The basin boundaries include 5 provinces (CALABARZON) and parts of 
Metro Manila. It serves as the main source of living for its over 13 million inhabitants. 
It is also a host to some 10,000 multi-scaled enterprises. Table 1 shows the number of 




                                                 
 




Table 1.  Number of Industries in theLaguna de Bay Region, 2002. 
Registered     2,309  
Wet  599     
Dry  591     
Wet and Dry    890     
Unclassified  229     
Monitored and Unregistered *     1,464  
TOTAL     3,773 
Source: (Source LLDA-MIS, October 2002) 
* Firms that were already inspected by LLDA, but have not yet engaged in any transactions with them. 
 
As a result of the continuous increase in the number of enterprises being built 
within the Lake’s Region, pollution has become inevitable. Figure 2 shows the pollution 












Figure 2.   Sources of Pollution within the Laguna de Bay Region.  
   (Source: LLDA) 
Laguna de Bay is presently being eyed as a possible source of domestic water 
supply for Metro Manila and nearby provinces. Therefore, there has been a need to 
protect and maintain the ecological integrity of the lake by reducing, if not completely 
eradicating, pollution. Thus, in January 1997, the Laguna Lake Development Authority 
launched the Environmental User Fee System (EUFS).  The EUFS is a pioneer water 
pollution charge system in the Philippines. It has become an integral part of LLDA’s 
Environmental Management Program and was included in the Laguna de Bay Master 
Plan, which emphasizes the use of economic incentives to address environmental 
problems and issues. 
The EUFS is a market-based policy instr u m e n t  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  u s e r  f e e  
implemented to complement the existing regulatory mechanisms of LLDA. Its main 
objective is to encourage companies to install and operate pollution prevention and/or 
abatement systems within their establishments. The system was based on the "Polluter 
Pays Principle". Here, the establishments are held responsible for any damage inflicted 






are encouraged to consider the environmental impacts of their activities into their 
decision-making process. 
6.1.2  Who Are Covered? 
In 1997, the EUFS was first applied to all industrial wastewater discharges 
along the leading industry sub-sectors with annual load of 4,000 kilograms BOD. In 
1998 to 1999, the system’s coverage expanded to include industries, subdivisions and 
commercial establishments as well as food chains and restaurants. Even firms which 
practiced zero discharge schemes were covered. Therefore, the 4,000 kg/yr BOD load 
cut-off has since been abolished (LLDA 2001). 
  At present, the EUFS now covers all enterprises within the administrative 
jurisdiction of LLDA that discharge wastewater in the Laguna de Bay system. These 
include commercial/industrial establishments; agro-based industries/ establishments 
(such as swine farms and slaughterhouses); clustered dwellings (i.e. residential 
subdivisions); as well as domestic households. Efforts toward the expansion of the 
EUFS to include households are underway. 
6.1.3  What are the Charges? 
Under this scheme LLDA charges industrial and commercial establishments in 
the Laguna de Bay catchment an annual user fee based on volume of discharge and 
BOD5 load in the wastewater. Thus, 
 
AF = FF + (VF * TBOD5) 
 
where: 
AF = Total annual user fee (PHP) 
FF = Fixed fee (PHP) 
VF = Variable fee (PHP) 
 
 
The formula for obtaining the total annual BOD5 is: 
 
TBOD5 = CBOD5 * Q * d * Cf  
 
where: 
TBOD5 = total annual BOD5 in kg  
CBOD5  = average effluent concentration of BOD5 (mg/li) 
Q  = daily wastewater discharge (m
3/d) 
d  = number of discharging days per year 
Cf  = unit conversion factor (10
-3 ) 
 
The fixed fee covers the cost of the program administration and is dependent on 
the volumetric rate of discharge. Fixed fees are based on the number of wastewtaer 
sampling needed to monitor the firms’ environmental performance. LLDA claims that 
the larger the firm in terms of volume of wastewater discharge, the more sampling will 





The  variable fee is assessed based on the unit load of pollution which is 
computed as the product of the volumetric rate of discharge and the effluent 
concentration.  
Table 2 shows the historical rates of the EUF.  Since its implementation in 1997, 
the structure of the variable fee has remained the same: PHP 5.00 per kg BOD for 
compliant firms and PHP 30.00 per kg BOD in excess of the standard. The fixed fee, on 
the other hand, increased by 60% between 1997 and 2005 with the addition of a 
processing fee worth PHP 5,000. 
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6.2 Survey Results 
6.2.1  Profile of the 89 Sample Firms  
Who Responded to the Survey? 
The survey was intended for firm managers,  supervisors and pollution control 
officers as they are in the best position to talk about their perceptions on the  impact  of 
the EUF on the environmental performance of their respective firms. They are also  
deemed to have the information and experience edge where the various sources of 
pressure affecting the firms’ pollution abatement behavior are concerned. Of the 89 
respondents to our survey, 58% occupied top management positions and 39% were 
pollution control officers who were generally also engineers and heads of the 
environment and safety department of the firms. Forty-five or 51% of firms were from 
Metro Manila, 35 or 37% were located in Laguna, and the rest were from Batangas, 
Cavite and Rizal. 
Firm Classification by Industrial Sub-sector and Volume of Wastewater 
Discharge 
Figure 3 shows that firms engaged in metal finishing, electronics, automotive 
and semiconductor industries topped the list of our sample respondents (35%).This is 
followed by companies in the chemicals, pharmeceuticals, plastics and laundry services 
industries (20%) and those involved in food and beverages sub-sector (18%). Other 
firms surveyed were the malls, hotels and restaurants. The rest were companies in the 





















Figure 3.  Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by Industrial Sub-sector, 2004. 
 
Classification of sample firms by volume of daily wastewater discharge shows a 
slight dominance of small firms (<30 cu.m. per day) which comprised 40% and a more 
or less equal representation of medium (30 to 150 cu.m. per day) to large firms (>150 





A further stratification of the sample by subsector reveals that except in the pulp 
and paper, chemical/pharmaceutical and the “others” sector,  firms in general have 
reduced their volume of wastewater between 1999 and 2004. Thus, we see relative 
dominance  of the small and medium-sized firms by 2004 (Table 3). 
 
Table  3.      Percent  Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by Volume of 
Wastewater and by Sub-sector, 1999 and 2004  
 
   1999 2004 













 Food & Beverage (n=16)   19  13  69  25  19  56 
 Pulp & Paper (n=3)       100      100 
 Garments & Textile (n=7)     71  29  29  43  29 
 Chemical/Pharma (n=18)   44  44  11  50  33  17 
 Metal finish/electronic (n=32)   53  22  25  56  31  13 
 Others (n=13)   23  31  46  15  31  54 
 
6.2.2  Impacts of the EUFS  
Having been regulated by LLDA for six  years from 1999 to 2004, the 89 survey 
respondents are  deemed to be in the best position to give their perceptions on how the 
imposition of the EUFS impact on their actions and behavior toward pollution 
abatement. The discussions that follow are divided into quantitative and qualitative 
impacts of the EUFS. 
The quantitative impacts include six-year trends in average a) EUF paid; b) 
volume of wastewater discharge; c) BOD concentration measured in mg/li; d) BOD 
loading in kg per year; e) BOD compliance rate (%); f) changes in chemical use and g) 
nature of and capital investment in abatement technology . There are three levels of  
discussions and analysis: the aggregate sample then by industrial sub-sector and then by  
volume of wastewater disharge. 
The qualitative impacts capture how firms perceive various sources of pressure 
for pollution abatement and then how these perceptions affect or influence their internal 
attittudes and actions related to the firms’ enviromental performance. 
Quantitative Impacts of the EUFS  
EUF Paid by Firms 
Over the period 1999-2004, there has been a decreasing trend in the average 
EUF paid by the 89 firms (Figure 4). However, from 2001 onward, the fixed fees paid 
by firms dominate the variable fee.  
Across sub-sectors, the same declining trend in average EUF is seen, with the 
exception of the chemical/pharmaceutical and laundry sub-sector. The food & beverage 
sub-sector as well as the pulp and paper sub-sectors recorded the highest percent 






the highest  EUF was paid by a food & beverage firm amounting to PHP704,822. After 
six years of regulation, the maximum EUF paid by a firm in this same sector dropped by 




























EUF    Fixed Fee    Variable Fee
 
Figure  4.  Average EUF Paid by 89 Firms, 1999-2004. 
 
Table 4a.   Average EUF Paid by 89 Sample Firms, by Sub-sector, 1999-2004 
Average EUF Paid (‘000 PHP) 
Sub-sector  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 
  
 Food & Beverage   91.3  34.3  39.2  20.5  23.3  19.4 
 Pulp and Paper   110.6 259.6  65.3  42.5  54.2  44.4 
 Garments & Textile  24.7  13.6  31.6  21.2  15.6  17.2 
  Chemicals/Pharma  11.0  18.1 14.3 18.7 27.6  32.1 
 Metal finishing/Electronics   14.3  15.4  16.0  14.4  16.2  14.2 
 Others   25.7  28.5  31.0  36.6  23.6  24.4 
 
Table 4b  presents the distribution of firms according to the fixed fees paid from  1999 
and 2004.  On the other hand, Table 4c shows the average variable fees paid.Except for 
the chemicals/pharmaceuticals/laundry sub-sector, and all things equal, the declining 
trend in average variable fees also reflect decreasing BOD loadings since variable fees 











Table 4b.  Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by Fixed Fees Paid, by Sub-sector, 1999-
2004 
Legal Basis & 
Effectivity    Fixed Fee (Php)   1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
                 
    <30 m3/day              
 BR 33, Jan 17, 1997   5,000  19  21  29  15     
 BR 176, Apr 16, 2002    6,800                       8  22 
        
25 
    8,000<fee<10,000         1     
                 
    30-150 m3/day              
 BR 33, Jan 17, 1997   10,000   17  27  17  11     
 BR 176, Apr 16, 2002  
                          
12,000         11  24  22 
  
 
10,000<fee<14,000         2  1 
                 
   >150 m3/day              
 BR 33, Jan 17, 1997  
                      
15,000   20  29  33  12     
 BR 176, Apr 16, 2002  
                             
18,000       19  25  23 
    >18000
a      4  9  8 
    Total
b   56 77 79 80 83 79 
 
a Firms had  more than one outlet of wastewater for sampling  
b May not equal 89 because of missing data 
 
 
Table 4c.  Average Variable Fees Paid by 89 Sample Firms, by Sub-sector, 1999-2004 
   
Average Variable Fee (‘000 PHP) 
Sub-sector  1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  2004
 Food & Beverage   87.4  22.2  29.6  7.4  7.7  5.1 
 Pulp and paper   95.6  244.6
3 49.0 25.5 36.2  28.4 
 Garments & Textile  13.1  3.6  19.1  7.9  4.5  4.9 
 Chemicals /Pharma  3.4  8.6  6.0  8.6  13.1  17.7 
 Metal finishing/Electronics   6.0  4.9  6.8  3.0  3.0  2.6 
 Others   15.9  16.4  16.0  23.4  9.4  9.5 
 
                                                 
3 LLDA data show that only two out of three firms surveyed in the pulp and paper sector paid variable fee 







By size, Figure 5 shows that the average variable fee  paid by medium and large 
firms did not change much  over the span of 6 years. It is the small firms that appear to 


















Small (<30 m3/day) Medium (30-150 m3/day) Large (>150 m3/day)
 
Figure 5.  Average Variable Fee  paid by 89 Sample Firms, by Volume of Wastewater 
Discharge, 1999-2004 
 
Volume of Daily Wastewater Discharge  
The 89 sample firms had an average wastewater discharge of 621 m
3 per day in 
1999. This steadily decreased over the years to an average of 349 m
3 per day by 2004 
(Figure 6). In  fact, there are relatively more firms in 2004 that are classified as small 
(39%), discharging less than 30 cu.m of wastewater per day, compared to only 35% in 
1999; subsequently, the proportion of  large firms or those dicharging more than 150 






























Table 5a.   Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by Volume of Wastewater Discharge,  
1999 and 2004 
 Category  1999 2004 
 No.  %  No.  % 
Small (<30 m3/day)  31  35  35  39 
Medium (30-150 m3/day)  26  29  26  29 
Large (>150 m3/day)  32  36  28  31 
 
Across sub-sectors, the sample firms, excluding those in the pulp and paper as 
well as the “others” sectors, clustered to an average of less than 500 m
3 per day by 
2004. The pulp and paper sector whose production is quite water-dependent, posted an 
average of about 2,000 m
3 per day, albeit this is already a remarkable decrease from the 
starting average of 10,000 m
3 per day in 1999 (Table 5b). 
 
Table 5b.   Average Volume of Wastewater, 89 Sample Firms, by Sub-sector, 1999-
2004 
Sub-sector 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
 
Food & Beverage  459  457  336  334  392  309 
Pulp & Paper  10,391  9,891  3,589  2,539  2,194  2,126 
Garments & Textile  312  244  301  246  217  216 
Chemical/Pharma 318  93 309  309  356  388 
Metal finish/electronic  168  140  107  85  100  98 
Others 267  588  643  586  643  626 
 
BOD Concentration 
Over the period 1999-2004, the 89 sample firms, on average,  registered  BOD 
concentrations that were  less than the 50 mg/liter BOD standard and exhibited 
declining trend through the years (Figure 7a). A closer look into the proportion of firms 
that performed much better than the standard revealed that in 1999, 57% of  them 
already posted BOD concentration at <10 mg/li, while 28% had BOD concentrations 
between 10-50 mg/li. A mere 16% were not able to meet the 50 mg/li standard. By 



























































Figure 7b.   Percent Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by BOD Concentration (mg/li), 
1999 and 2004 
 
Sub-sectorwise, we see in Table 6 that the Metal finishing and electronics sector 
actually registered increasing trend in average BOD concentration, notably starting in 
2002. But this distorted trend is caused by extremely high concentrations from only 2 or 
3 firms
4; hence the average is pulled up. Otherwise, at least about 80% of  firms in this 
sub-sector actually have BOD concentrations of less than 10 mg/li from 2002-2004. The 
Pulp and paper sector, a heavy user of water and chemicals, showed steady 
concentration rates that were within the 50 mg/liter BOD standard. 
                                                 






Table 6.   Average BOD Concentration of 89 Firms, by Sub-sector, 1999-2004 
Average BOD Concentration (mg/li) 
Sub-sector  1999 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004
Food & Beverage  120  101  16  13  12  12 
Pulp and Paper  25  20  34  12  24  14 
Garments & Textile  60  40  32  30  33  11 
Chemicals/Pharma 14  19  18  12  10  15 
Metal finishing/electronics  30  27  12  4  3  8 




Average annual BOD loading of sample firms also declined over time. From an 
average high of about 10,000 kgs BOD, this went to down to about 1,000 in 2004. 
(Figure 8). By sub-sector, despite downtrend, we see the Pulp and Paper sector having 
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Table 7.  Average BOD Loading of 89 Firms, by Sub-sector, 1999-2004 
   BOD Loading ('000 kgs/year) 
Sub-sector  1999 2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 
      
Food & Beverage   1.9  7.4  1.1  0.9  1.0  0.8 
Pulp & Paper   136.5 101.8  25.8  8.1  8.2  6.4 
Garments & Textile   1.5  2.7  2.4  0.6  0.7  0.9 
Chemical/Pharma    0.8 0.3  0.4  1.5 1.3 1.0 
Metal finishing/electronics   0.6  0.9  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.3 
Others    1.5 5.2  4.9  1.5 1.2 1.4 
 
BOD Compliance Rate 
 
Defining Compliance Rate as: 
  
[Actual BOD - BOD Standard]  x 100 
BOD Standard 
 
this implies that a negative value means the firm is compliant and performs better than 
the standard. Figure 9 shows increasing compliance by firms over time. It is worthy to 
note that by 2004, firms’ BOD levels, on average, were 80% better than the standard, 
e.g., if the BOD standard is 50 mg/li, the sample firms’ actual BOD level, on average, 





































Figure 9.   Average BOD Compliance Rate by 89 Sample Firms, 1999-2004 
 
The same remarkable trend in compliance rate can be seen across all sub-sectors 
with the Metal finishing and electronics sub-sector registering the highest compliance 
rate by 2004. On the other hand, the Food and Beverage sub-sector made a good 




In Table 8b, we see the proportion of compliant firms across sub-sectors over 
time. Except for the Garments & Textile as well as the Metal finishing/Electronics sub-
sectors, all firms in the other subsectors were all meeting the standards by 2004. 
 
Table 8a.   Average BOD Compliance Rate by 89 Sample Firms, by Sub-sector, 1999-
2004 
Average BOD Compliance Rate (%)  Sub-sector 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 
 Food & Beverage  1.25 1.02 -0.71 -0.75 -0.78  -0.78 
 Pulp and Paper   -0.50 -0.60 -0.32 -0.76 -0.53  -0.72 
 Garments & Textile  0.20 -0.21 -0.37 -0.40 -0.35  -0.78 
 Chemicals/Pharma  -0.75 -0.64 -0.69 -0.78 -0.84  -0.71 
 Metal finishing/electronics   -0.39 -0.50 -0.79 -0.92 -0.94  -0.85 
 Others   -0.30 -0.54 -0.78 -0.86 -0.83  -0.82 
 
Table 8b     Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by Compliance to BOD Standard, by Sub-
sector, 1999-2004 
 
   Compliant Firms (%) 
Sub-sector  1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 
     
Food & Beverage   80  81  93  94  100  100 
Pulp & Paper   67  100  67  100  67  100 
Garments & Textile   71  71  71  71  71  71 
Chemical/Pharma    94 100 93 100  94  100 
Metal finishing/electronics   80  87  93  100  100  97 
Others   92  92  100  100  100  100 
 
Changes in Chemical Use 
To be certain, these companies engaged in various technological methods and 
procedures  to be able to attain the effluent standards. One of the adjustments made in 
response to the EUF was to adopt changes in the use of chemicals in their various 
operations. The more common change enacted was the reduction in at least one of the 
more environment-damaging chemical and Figure 10 shows that this was done by the  
majority of the respondents (44%). The two other changes in chemical use were to 
employ more environment-friendly chemicals as replacements (22%) or eliminate the 
use of harmful chemicals altogether (19%). Some of the other firms didn’t have to make 
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Figure 10.   Changes in Chemical Use in Response to the EUF, 89 Firms, 2004 
             
Waste Management Systems and Wastewater Treatment Facilities  
Aside from changes in the use of chemicals, the more obvious manifestation of 
the impact of the EUF is the existence of waste management systems (WMS) and 
installation of wastewater treatment facilities (WWTF). Waste management system 
includes all activities, strategies and periodic trainings of firm’s manpower that 
eventually lead to waste minimization, reduction, recycling and reuse. New methods of 
WMS involve the reduction, substitution and elimination of environmentally harmful 
chemicals. Wastewater treatment facilities refer to the physical equipment or plant that 
can  have either primary and/or secondary treatment components
6. 
 Survey data show that 75% of sample firms have waste management systems. 
Thiry-three percent (33%) of these fims had their WMS  existing even before the EUFS 
was implemented (see Table 12).  
Primary wastewater treatment facilities have  been installed  by 70 firms or 
about 80% of the sample.  One third of these 70 firms have put up their primary 
treatment plants even before the imposition of the EUFS. Half of the firms, though, 
installed the facilities after the EUFS imposition. The more common type of primary 
abatement technology consisted of physical or a combination with chemical treatment 
facility. For the physical treatment system, majority of the firms made use of 
combination of methods on the list. For chemical treatment plant, most firms employed 
PH adjustment and also a combination of the other methods. 
On the other hand, 57 out of the 89 sample firms (64%) installed secondary 
treatment systems. It is interesting to note that half of these 57 firms  had put up the 
facilities before the EUFS was implemented. The activated sludge was the common 
type of secondary treatment system used. 
                                                 




Table 9a.   Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by Abatement Technology 
(PrimaryTreatment System) 
ITEM No.  % 
       
1.1 Has primary treatment system (PTS) (n=89)  70  79 
      
1.2  Period when PTS was installed (n=70)      
       Before EUFS (1997)  24  34 
       After EUFS (1997)  34  49 
       Do not know  12  17 
    
1.3  Type of Primary Treatment System (n=70)      
       Physical treatment system only  28  40 
       Chemical treatment system only  7  10 
       Both treatment system  35  50 
       
1.4 Composition of Physical Treatment System (n=70)      
      Screening  10  14 
      Equalization  12  17 
      Grit removal  2  3 
      Oil-water separator  5  7 
      Sedimentation  5  7 
      Two or more of the above  33  47 
      Do not know  3  3 
       
1.5  Composition of Chemical Treatment  System (n=70)      
       Adsorption  1  2 
       Disinfection  5  8 
       Flocculation  7  11 
       PH Adjustment  21  33 
      Others  4  6 
















Table 9b.   Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by Abatement Technology (Secondary 
Treatment System) 
ITEM No.  % 
      
1.1 Has secondary treatment system (STS) (n=89)  57  64 
      
1.2  Period when STS was installed (n=57)      
       Before EUFS (1997)  30  53 
       After EUFS (1997)  20  35 
       Do not know  7  12 
       
1.3  Type of Secondary Treatment System (n=57)      
       Activated sludge  26  46 
       Anaerobic & aerobic treatment  7  12 
       Aerobic treatment  2  4 
       Oxidation/stabilizer  5  9 
       Rotating biological contractors  2  4 
       Trickling filter  3  5 
       Two or more of the above  10  18 
       Do not know  2  2 
 
 
Investments in wastewater treatment facilities are alleged to have been 
extremely costly for the firms, ranging  between PHP25 thousand to PHP60 million 
with an average of PHP8 million. The greater majority of  the firms spent at least PHP 2 
million for treatment systems.  However, abatement facilities of most firms are   
relatively old, having been put up  at least  10 years ago (Table 9c). Table 9d presents 











                                                 
7 The analysis is limited by the incomplete information provided by firms on the nature, characteristics 
and cost of abatement technology investment as these were not the focus of the study. Future researches 





Table 9c.  Distribution of 89 Sample Firms by Age and Investment Cost of Abatement 
Technology 
Age of  Abatement Technology  No.   %  
        <10 years  18 
      
38  
      10-20 years  17 
      
36  
         >20 years  12 
      
26  
        
Investment Cost (PHP)  No.   %  
  
<30,000   1  2 
30,000-100,000 1  2 
0.1M-0.5M 9  14 
0.5M-0.9M 5  8 
1M-2M 8  12 
>2M 41  63 
total 65  100 
       
Min   25 T     
Max   60 M     
Average     8 M     
 
 
Table 9d.  Average Investment Cost of Abatement Technology, by Age and Type of 
Technology and by Sub-sector, 89 Sample Firms 
   Average Investment Cost (million PHP)    
Sub-sector*          <10 years           >=10 years    
   Activated sludge 
 
Others  Activated sludge   Others 
Food & Beverage   15.9  3.0  4.0  29.3 
Garments & Textile   -  -  15.0  4.5 
Chemicals & Pharma   -  -  3.8  7.2 
Metal Finishing & 
Electronics   3.5  9.9  13.2  9.9 
Others   8.2  6.0  2.9  - 
* Insufficient data for Pulp and Paper sub-sector. 
In general, firms have installed relatively high cost technology since there are 





in similar industries whose costs are, on average,  at least twice as cheap than what the 
surveyed firms have invested
8.  
It is evident that about 50% of the firms have earmarked less than  two percent 
of their annual income for pollution abatement expenditures. 
Surveyed firms, in general, are complaining about the high cost or financial 
burden of investing in wastewater treatment plants. Technically, however, they also 
have the option of simply keeping their pollution levels more or less the same over time 
and then pay the wastewater fees instead. Thus, in the interest of comparing these two 
options, the pollution fees that the enterprises would have paid had they not reduced 
their pollution between 1999 and 2004 were estimated and then compared to their 
investment cost on abatement technology. Tables 10a and 10b show this information in 
nominal and real terms. Barring huge  transaction costs and other potential/hidden fees 
that have not been accounted for, it appears that firms would be financially better off by 
paying the pollution fees instead of installing wastewater treatment facilities. 
Nevertheless, it is conjectured that firms could possibly  have more overriding concerns 
and motivations for investing in  pollution abatement technologies. 
 
Table 10a.   Estimated Pollution Fees (in nominal terms, PHP M) if Sample Firms Did    
Not Install Treatment Facilities, by Sub-sector 
 Sub-sector   1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
1999-
2004 
 Food & Beverage   0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.41  2.45 
 Pulp & Paper   1.69  1.69  1.69  1.69  1.69  1.69  10.15 
 Garments & 
Textile    0.40  0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 2.42 
 Chemical & 
Pharma   0.38  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 2.27 
 Metal Finishing & 
Electronics    0.38  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 2.28 
  Others    0.39  0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 2.35 
 All Firms   0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  2.59 
      
      
     
                                                 
8 These estimates were obtained from expert opinion and are based on the cost of waste treatment 
facilities currently in use by other firms in similar industries. The technical coefficients are as follow: a) 
The investment cost for aerobic treatment w/o mechanical aerators  and unclassified anaerobic treatment 
is PHP 61 - 121 per liter; b) The investment cost for oxidation, aerobic treatment w/ mechanical aerators, 
aerobic treatment w/ mechanical aerators +  anaerobic treatment  is PHP 15 - 91 PHP per liter; c) The 






Table 10b.   Estimated Pollution Fees (in real terms, PHP M) if Sample Firms Did Not 
Install Treatment Facilities, by Sub-sector 
Sub-sector    1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1999-2004 
 Food & Beverage   0.41  0.37  0.34  0.31  0.28  0.25  1.95 
 Pulp & Paper   1.69  1.54  1.40  1.27  1.16  1.05  8.10 
 Garments & Textile   0.40  0.37  0.33  0.30  0.28  0.25  1.93 
 Chemical & Pharma   0.38  0.34  0.31  0.28  0.26  0.24  1.81 
 Metal Finishing & Electronics  0.38  0.34  0.31  0.29  0.26  0.24  1.82 
 Others   0.39  0.35  0.32  0.30  0.27  0.24  1.87 
 All Firms   0.43  0.39  0.36  0.33  0.30  0.27  2.07 
 
Qualitative Impacts of the EUFS  
Sources of Pressure for Pollution Abatement as Perceived by Firms 
The main objective of this study is to look into the determinants of the 
enviornmental behavior of firms and facilities. What are the sources of pressure faced 
by the firm that affect their decisions to improve their environmental performance? Is 
the EUF still a source of pressure for regulated firms?  Or are there other pressure 
factors that work in complement with the EUF or overrides the impact of the EUF 
altogether? 
Table 11 shows that firm managers and pollution control officers perceive 
governments in general (cited by 68 or 79% of respondents) to be the main source of 
pressure and this  is consistent with the findings of Doonan et al (2002). Regulations 
such as the EUF are tools used by governments and therefore would fall within this 
pressure category  .There is also  pressure from customers although they are not a major 
source as in the findings of Henriques and Sadorsky (1995).  Clients of firms are 
actually the 2
nd important  source of pressure (cited by 19 or 21% of respondents). 
Pressure from the community and environmental groups is perceived as 3
rd important 
source of pressure. Similar to the results of Doonan et al (2002) but unlike those of 
Lanoie et al (1998);  Konar and Cohen (2001) (cited by Doonan et al 2002), creditors, 


















1st Source Increased 
Most in the Past 5 
Years 
Governments in general  68  0 0  39 
Customers 6  19  6 3 
Public/community pressure  0  5  14  2 
Environmental groups  0  0  15  2 
Employees 1  4  2  0 
Investors/bankers/shareholders 1  2  1  3 
Suppliers 1  1  1  1 
Competitors 0  1  3  0 
Others 0  1  12  1 
No response  2  8  7  15 
 
Changes in Firms’ Internal Attitudes and Actions 
As discussed in the framework shown in Figure 1, the way that environmental 
managers and supervisors view the various sources of pressure will then affect their 
decisions on what courses of action to pursue in relation to improving environmental 
performance. The following sections will now discuss these sets of action. 
 The existence of an integrated environmental management system (EMS) or an 
environmental management plan (EMP) is the more common indicator of integration 
activities particulalry in developed countries (Doonan et al 2002; Henriques and 
Sadorsky 1995). However, this study suggests that the presence of a waste management 
system (WMS) is the more appropriate indicator to use insofar as the environmental 
regulatory measures in the country focus on effluent standards: Biological Oxygen 
Demand (BOD) and Total Suspended Solids (TSS).  
It can be seen from Table 12 that the greater majority of the sample firms have 
WMS. About one-fifth of them are already ISO 14000 registered while one-third intend 
to become registered. There is a joint employer-employee committee on the 























Existence of a waste mgt 
system 75  20  3  1 
Intention to obtain ISO 14000 
certification 30  29  18  4 
Already ISO 14000 registered  18 
 
    
Existence of a joint committee 
on env't   57 33  4  6 















know  N/A N/R 
top management  51  34  8  1  4  1  0  1 
engineering 52  26  11  3  7  0  0  1 
production 52  21  13  3  6  0  2  2 
research and development  22  19  11  9  29  1  4  3 
 
Active participation of 














   46  29  12  4  1  3  3 
N/A – not applicable; N/R- no response 
It is worth noting that for at least half of the sample firms, there are formal and 
frequent consultations between environmental services and top management, 
engineering and production. Environmental policy development is also participated in 
actively and jointly by management and employees. However, very little contact is 
made between environmental services and research and development. 
In terms of investing in human resources by providing trainings related to the 
environment, not all of senior management nor all of the employees are given the 
opportunity (Table 13). It goes without saying that these training activities whether 
conducted in-house or elsewhere entail costs that firms are not always ready to shell out 
due to financial constraints. The pollution control officers are the sure recipients of 
these training activties since LLDA, for one, requires their participation in the annual 
programs conducted by the regulatory agency. 
Most firms consider environmental issues in the performance evaluation of their 
emplpoyees but only one quarter of the firms actually consider environmental concerns 










Table 13.    Human Resources, 89 Sample Firms, 2004 
   Responses (%) 
Categories of employees who have  All  Some  None  Do not  N/A  N/R
received an environmental training:           know       
          Production employees  28  53  15  2  0  2 
          Supervisors  34  45  16  0  1  4 
          New employees  29  29  36  0  1  4 
          Administrative employees  25  42  29  0  0  4 
          Technical specialists  28  56  11  0  1  3 
          Senior managers  28  46  20  0  1  4 
   Responses (%) 
Environmental issues is considered 
in: Agree  Agree  Somewhat  Totally  Do  not N/R
   totally somewhat  disagree  disagree  know    
         Compensation package  22  39  12  19  0  7 
         Workers' performance  
            Evaluation  48  38  6  3  1  3 
N/A – not applicable; N/R- no response 
Table 14 shows the financial resources indicator as proxied by various 
indicators. The table reveals that primary and secondary wastewater treatment facilities 
for 33% and 26% of the sample firms, respectively, were already in place even before 
the establishment of the EUFS. Thus, it can be said that the concern for the environment 
has already been a part of the operation of these firms due to a variety of reasons like 
the implementation of the pollution control law, the mother company (usually foreign 
owned) requires it or the firm itself is proactive and believes in environmental 
proetction.  
The budget and personnel alloted for environmental issues generally remained 
the same in the last five years . Some firms managed to increase them. 
 
Table 14.   Financial Resources, 89 Sample Firms,  2004 
   Responses (%) 
Number of years since the  





     Primary effluent treatment   
         System  2  29  33  35 
     Secondary effluent treatment  
         System  3  25  26  46 
   Responses (%) 
Resources devoted to the   Reduced Maintained  Increased 
Do not 
know/ 
Environment           N/R 
      Personnel  9  3  16  45 
      Budget  6  21  26  47 





Monitoring system and activities (Table 15) have been proxied by indicators 
pertaining to external audits, following of recommendation of auditing institutions and 
chemical risk assessment. Three quarters of the firms have been doing external waste 
audits and performing chemical risk assessment in the last five years. Two-thirds of the 
firms often follow the recommendations made by external audit agencies.  
Monitoring activities are common for the sample firms since they are required 
by LLDA to submit quarterly self-monitoring reports (SMRs). 
 
Table 15 .   Monitoring activities by 89 Sample Firms, 2004 
Monitoring Activity  Responses (%) 
Yes  No  Do not know 
N/R 
N/A  External auditing done during the last five 
years  72 22  2  3 
Chemical risk assessment during the last 
five years  76  15  4  5 
Always Often Rarely N/R 
Recommendation from audits are followed  36 28  7  29 
 
Environmental performance in this paper was proxied by indicators such as the 
BOD compliance rate as well as the existence of fines and receipt of notices of 
violations in the last five years from 2004. 
More than 52% of the sample firms, though, received notices of violations in the 
last five years and 57% of them had to pay fines for the same period. Almost all of the 
firms experienced no spills of wastewater (Table 16).  
 
Table 16.   Environmental Performance of 89 Sample Firms, 2004 
     Responses (%) 




Had to pay fine during the last five years      53  43  1  3 
Had Spills (during the last year)      3  92  1  3 
Non-compliance with regulations                 
   Received Notice of Violation in the past 5  
        years      48  46  3  2 
   Received Cease and Desist Order in the past 5  
        years    6  89  2  3 
N/R - no response 






Perceptions on Advantages and Disadvantages of the EUFS 
When asked about the main advantage of the EUF imposition to the firm, most 
firms perceive the EUFS as being advantageous in forcing them to enhance their 
environmental consciousness and control waste and pollution. However, the majority of 
the respondents also lament the fact that complying with the EUFS meant heavy 
financial burden that made firms less competitive. 
Four out of 10 respondents  refused to give any comment
9 while 8 percent were 
bold enough to say that the EUF did not bring any advantage to the firm whatsoever 
(Table 17).   
However, the remaining half of the sample had the common perception that the 
EUF has raised the environmental consciousness of the firms and forced them to control 
waste and pollution to comply with standards. The main motivation, therefore, that 
drives these firms to engage in environmental protection was to meet the effluent 
standards and avoid paying penalties that were perceived as exhorbitant. Cost saving 
also meant mitigating damages to the firm that can result from being labeled as non-
compliant to regulations. Hence, firms were also motivated to meet standards to protect 
their public image and reputation. 
 
Table 17.   Main Advantages of the EUF as Perceived by 89 Firms, 2004 
 
Main Advantage of EUF  % 
 
Control waste & pollution/encourage envt'l  
     consciousness  29 
Compliance to envt'l standards  10 
Cost-saving 4 
Others 8 
No advantage  8 
No response  40 
 
A major setback as perceived by firms with respect to the imposition of the 
EUF, however, are the very expensive investment and operating costs of wastewater 
treatment facilities (Table 18). These extremely high expenditures eat up on their profit 
and more imprtantly, make them unnecessairly less competitive particularly against 
firms that are outside the LLDA jurisdiction. A common sentiment voiced out by the 
respondents is that there should be equal implementation of the environmental standards 
across all firms in the country. 
                                                 
9 But given the nature of Filipinos to typically withhold negative comments or criticisms, we take this ‘no 
comment’ or ‘no response’ behavior of respondents to be implying the exact opposite—that they have 
indeed many things to say but were hesitant to say it or worse, write it for fear of being implicated. True 





Furthermore, there is the all-important  perception that LLDA should give 
proper incentives to firms that perform much better than the standard since marginal 
abatement cost was also very high.. 
Another useful insight that was raised was that the regulating agency has the  
responsibility of not only monitoring compliance but disseminating information on cost 
effective and efficient pollution abatement technology. Many firms end up incurring 
very high opportunity costs of  having invested in the wrong technology simply because 
they don’t have access to information on which appropriate technology will enable their 
firms to comply with the standards and at the same time one that would not be as costly. 
 
Table 18.  Main Disadvantages of the EUF as Perceived by 89 Firms, 2004 
Main Disadvantage of EUF  % 
Very costly/expensive treatment facilities/less competitive  38 
Difficult to attain standards/no technical support  2 
Unequal implementation of EUFS; bribes and negotiations  8 
No disadvantage  11 
No response  40 
 
 
    6.3  Sample Selection and Survey Non-Response 
 
To reiterate from Section 4.3 on sampling procedure, the original 270 firms 
were not all interviewed for the following reasons: 72 firms were not stand-alone 
industrial facilities, 21 closed down, and 88 refused to participate in the survey. Thus, 
there were only a total of 89 firms that were personally interviewed.  Nevertheless, 
firms that did not participate in the survey had pollution data available from their SMRs.  
A possible problem with non-response is that it could have been a systematic 
rather than a random attrition. That is, the non-surveyed firms could have been more 
reluctant to be interviewed because they could have had very high BOD Loadings and 
EUFs than the 89 surveyed firms and were, therefore, not very compliant . In other 
words, there could have been, unknowingly, a sample selection that  could lead to a 
downward bias in the estimates. 
To test for sample selection bias, simple t-tests of means on pollution data of 
surveyed and non-responsive firms were done. Tables 19a to 19eshow the mean  BOD 
Loading, Volume of Wastewater Discharge, EUF Paid,  BOD Concentration and BOD 








Table 19a.  Mean BOD Loading for Surveyed and Non-Surveyed Firms 
Group Obs  Mean  Std.  Err. 
Non-Survey 88  2695.96  791.47 
Survey 89  2829.88  1482.04 
      
combined 177  2763.30  840.35 
      
diff  
-133.91 
(-0.08)  1685.49 
*- t statistics in parenthesis 
 
Table 19b.  Mean Volume of  Wastewater Discharge for Surveyed and                          
Non-Surveyed Firms 
Group Obs  Mean  Std.  Err. 
Non-Survey 88  265.02  45.05 
Survey 89  444.49  126.28 
      
combined 177  355.27  67.48 
      
diff  
-179.47 
(-1.33)  134.67 
*- t statistics in parenthesis 
 
 
Table 19c.  Mean EUF for Surveyed and Non-Surveyed Firms  
Group Obs  Mean  Std.  Err. 
Non-Survey 88  30776.21  3395.37 
Survey 89  25855.50  3164.69 
      
combined 177  28273.68  2319.14 
      
diff  
4920.71 
(1.06)  4637.28 
*- t statistics in parenthesis 
 
Table 19d.  Mean BOD Concentration for Surveyed and Non-Surveyed Firms 
Group Obs  Mean  Std.  Err. 
Non-Survey 88  29.37  9.24 
Survey 89  17.73  2.03 
      
combined 177  23.51  4.71 











Table 19e.  Mean Compliance Rate for Surveyed and Non-Surveyed Firms 
 
Group Obs  Mean  Std.  Err. 
Non-Survey 88  -0.10  0.26 
Survey 89  -0.55  0.08 
      
combined 177  -0.33  0.14 
      
diff  
0.45 
(1.62)  0.28 
*- t statistics in parenthesis 
 
The results of the simple two tailed T-tests above reject, at a 1% level of 
confidence, the alternative hypothesis that there are differences between the group 
means. These results hold for all the environmental performance indicators such as the  
BOD loading, BOD Concentration, Volume of Wastewater Discharge,  Compliance 
Rate, and the EUF. This implies that, after controlling for the presence of outliers, there 
are no significant differences, on average, in the aforementioned variables between the 
two groups of surveyed and non-surveyed firms. Thus, the problem of sample selection 
bias might not be evident in the data. 
 Appendix Figures 1a to 1e show comparative pictures of the environmental 
performance indicators of the 89 sample (surveyed) firms and the 88 non-surveyed 
firms for the period 1999-2004. The non-significant difference in the means of the 
variables between the two groups can readily be seen as the respective averages tend to 
converge over time.  
 
6.4 Simultaneous Equation Model (EQS) Results and Analysis 
The survey data from the 89 firms were further analyzed using statistical 
techniques. In particular a simultaneous equation model was run to answer two 
important questions: (1) What factors statistically determine or affect compliance rate? 
and; (2) Once the compliance rate is known, what actions do firms undertake to improve 
or maintain compliance? 
 
  Results of the statistical analysis in Table 20 identified the following factors as 
determinants of compliance rate: (a) Investments in treatment facilities, (b) Monitoring 
activities, (c) Integration of environmental department with other units within the firm, 
(d) Environmental training of human resources, and (e) Involvement of top management 
in environmental affairs of the company. We now discuss the specific effects of these 
identified variables on the compliance rate of firms. 
  
1.  Investment in Treatment Facilities. Results showed that investment in treatment 
facilities tend to decrease compliance rate of firms. This relationship, although 
counterintuitive, implies mainly the trial and error approach in searching for the 
appropriate abatement technology. Thus, it seems to point to technological constraints 







  The feedback effect of compliance rate on investments, however, is in the 
opposite direction. That is decreased compliance rate tend to induce increases in 
treatment facilities investments. Tracing out the series of feedback between compliance 
rate and investments leads to the following pattern: 
 
Low compliance rate → Increased investment → Lowers compliance further → 
Further increase in investments 
 
  This process shows that firms are locked into increasing investments on 
ineffective technologies in order to comply with standards. This does not mean, though, 
that firms do not comply or intends not to comply with rules, but rather firms comply in 
an inefficient and costly way. One clear policy implication is that informing firms of 
alternative and appropriate technology could lead to efficient compliance to standards. 
 
2.  Monitoring.  The analysis revealed that monitoring increases compliance rate. 
However, feedback effects of compliance rate on monitoring (i.e. the effect of observed 
compliance rate on the level of monitoring) run in the opposite direction. This means 
that increased compliance leads to decreased monitoring. This traces the following 
relationships:   
 
Low compliance rate → Increased monitoring → Increased compliance → 
Decreased monitoring 
 
This shows that monitoring activity firms is more reactive rather than proactive. Thus, 
we can see or expect cycles of compliance and non-compliance among firms. 
 
3.  Integration of environmental department with other units within the firm.  
Although inconclusive, integration tends to decrease compliance rate. We believe that 
this result is mainly driven by nature of the data. At least 50% of the surveyed firms did 
not respond or did not know how to answer the survey question properly. Future work 
would require reframing the question to help the respondents answer clearly, correctly, 
and truthfully. This result is admittedly a gray area of the analysis. 
 
4. Environmental Training of Personnel. Again a counterintuitive result is obtained. 
The statistically significant relationship is one wherein increased human resource 
training decreases compliance rate. However, this can be explained by looking at the 
scope and scale of personnel environmental training.  
 
  Environmental training is limited to PCOs and top management. Furthermore, 
the respondents mostly indicated that within this limited group, only a few actually are 
able to attend trainings.  The respondents also stated that most trainees are given an 
average of only 2 to 4 hours of training per year. Thus, the limited scale and scope of 
training may not be sufficient to increase environmental awareness and reverse adverse 
levels of compliance rate. A clear entry point for policy would be to increase the scale, 
scope, and quality of environmental trainings. 
 
5.  Involvement of top management in environmental affairs.  The increased 
involvement of top management again decreases compliance rate. In the survey, the 
respondents were asked about their perceptions on whether the firm has a proactive 
view towards waste management and whether the senior manager believes in 




agree or simply agreed with these statements. However, these perceptions seem to be 
not translated into concrete actions as the statistical analysis show.  
 
  None of the external sources of pressure (economic, social, legal, and internal 
pressures) were found to be directly affecting compliance rate. However, legal 
pressures seem to affect compliance indirectly through its effect on integration of 
environmental department with other units within the firm. In particular, legal 
pressures tend to increase integration. Because integration, on the other hand, 
negatively affects compliance, it can be concluded that increased legal pressures 
indirectly decreases compliance rate. Though the integration-compliance relationship is 
vague as earlier discussed, the indirect relationship between legal pressures and 
compliance is more interesting. The interesting insight that can be gleaned has 
something to do with the EUF structure. The current EUF structure is such that the fixed 
cost dominates the variable fee. This could provide the wrong incentives for firms. Take 
for example a firm with BOD loading above 150 m
3/day. The firm will have to pay the 
fixed fee of 24,000 pesos regardless of whether he abates further or not. Thus, there is a 
stronger incentive not to abate further because it is not only costly but, at the same time 
results into no benefit in terms of reduced charges. This might mean that it is worth 
looking at the possibility of restructuring the EUF in such a way that the variable fee 
dominates the fixed fee. It is believed that this restructuring can result into further 
increases in the compliance rate. 
 
  The other question we want to answer is what actions do firms take when they 
observe their compliance rate? The statistical model in general shows that observed low 
rates of compliance results to: (a) More involvement of top management in 
environmental affairs of the firm, (b) Less integration of environmental departments 
with other units within the firm, (c) Increased spending on pollution abatement, and (d) 
Increased monitoring activities. The feedback effects and their implications have been 




























Table  20.  Results of Simultaneous Equation (EQS) Estimation 
 














-- 1.090  -134.646*  0.005  1.441*  1.734* 
Top 
Management 
1.251* --  -47.273  -0.520  -3.491  4.126 
Integration 1.698*  0.161  --  4.121 0.722  -1.562* 
Human 
Resources 
0.376* 0.712*  23.536  --  1.404*  8.555 
Financial 
Resources 
2.376* 2.167*  -18.753*  -1.045  --  -0.742 
Monitoring -1.688*  2.340 47.193*  -0.060 -2.359  -- 
Legal 
Pressure 
0.313 0.314  30.972*  -0.578  -0.132  -0.900 
Economic 
Pressure 
-0.045 -0.681  -3.463  -0.585  1.061  -0.939 
Social 
Pressure 
0.042 0.138  7.411  -0.038  0.312  0.340 
Internal 
Pressure 
0.276 -0.100  -8.168  -1.136  -0.153  -1.926 
** - significant at 5% level 
 
7.0 DISSEMINATION RESULTS  
7.1  PLIGHT OF REGULATED FIRMS 
A dissemination seminar was given to the sample of regulated firms.  We sent 
out  a 9-page summary of the project’s findings to the firms that were unable to 
participate in the seminar. 
Five important issues
10 arising from our presentation were raised by the firms: 
The first is on our recommendation that they be proactive in collaborating with research 
and university institutions to improve their monitoring activities and compliance rate. 
The firms’ reaction  was that this collaboration will only be an exercise in futility as 
well as a costly endeavor because LLDA honors only the results of wastewater 
sampling coming from their own laboratory. While the Environment Mangement 
Bureau (EMB) of the DENR accredits certain laboratories, results from these accredited 
laboratories are not honored by LLDA insofar as renewing the firms’discharge permits 
is concerned. LLDA honors these laboratory results only in the submission of the self-
monitoring reports (SMRs) by firms. In the past,  firms have been doing split-sampling 
                                                 
10 These same issues were also raised and confirmed by other non-survey firms (those that were located 
inside industrial estates) during the 2nd Laguna de Bay Lake Summit on Aug 22, 2006 which was 




of their wastewater by accredited laboratories and LLDA. Firms claim that more often 
than not, their wastewater sample pass the standards according to results of accredited 
laboratories but LLDA laboratory results would unexpectedly show otherwise. Hence, 
firms will need to request LLDA for resampling of wastewater. This brings the 2
nd issue 
to the fore. Firms lament that for the past 10 years, LLDA has taken an unnecessarily 
longer period of time to respond to firms’ request for resampling, give or take at least 
two weeks lead time. With the penalty for non-compliance set at PHP1,000 per day of 
not meeting the standard, firms thus have to pay an additional cost of at least PHP 
14,000 on top of the  resampling fee. There is, therefore, the perception among firms 
that this delay in resampling is a ‘money-making’ activity by the regulatory agency. The 
suggestion is for LLDA to either start accrediting other laboratories and honor their 
results or LLDA expands its own laboratory services so as to accommodate more 
resampling requests per unit time and save the firms from unnecessarily high penalties.  
The 3
rd issue is on the potential to reduce compliance costs of firms by way of getting 
the right information about the appropriate technology to use to enable them to meet the 
standard. While it may be true that some firms (the larger ones probably) have 
discovered and adopted the cost efficient pollution abatement technology, most firms 
are still in need of valuable technological information to enable them to comply at lower 
costs. Hence, these firms are requesting LLDA to provide this crucial information 
service on a regular basis if possible. The 4
th issue is about asking LLDA for a ‘basket 
of carrots’, i.e., a package of incentives particularly for firms that have been performing 
much better than the 50 mg/li BOD standard (reaching as high as 80% off the standard). 
LLDA has to be made aware that the marginal cost of removing each kilogram BOD is 
significantly high yet some firms take it upon themselves to achieve very high 
compliance rates.    The 5
th issue concerns the firms’ clamor that regulation must not be 
limited to industries  since housheholds now account for almost 70% of the lake 
pollution. Hence, user fees should also be imposed on them. Industries  believe they 
have been paying their dues for a long time and that they have responded well to the 
EUFS. It is time that households shared that responsibility. To this end, firms think that 
the local government units (LGUs) have a crucial role to play. 
7.2  PLIGHT OF REGULATORY AGENCY (LLDA) 
Three dissemination seminars have been presented to LLDA at the main office 
in Metro Manila. The first seminar  was given on August 15, 2006 with the LLDA GM, 
and 3 Division staff as audience. The project team was requested to make a second 
presentation to the extended management committee (MANCOM) on August 23, 2006. 
The extended MANCOM consists of all division heads (e.g., Pollution Control 
Division, Laboratory Division, Legal Division, Training Division, Community 
Development Division) and some other designated representatives. A third presentation 
was made on October 19, 2006 with the staff of the Pollution Control Division and the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Unit as audience. There was some question 
regarding the validity and potential biasedness of the results considering that 89 firms 
may not be representative of the current population of more than a thousand regulated 
firms. But we explained that the target and appropriate population are the 177 stand-
alone industrial firms  regularly monitored by LLDA from 1999-2004 and not the 
relatively new entrants into the EUFS regulation since the older firms are in a better 
position to really evaluate the impacts of the EUFS. Eighty-nine (89) out of 177 is 
already  50% of the appropriate survey group. Besides, the results of the t-tests of means 
confirm the absence of sample selection bias. It is presumed that overall, the 





The reactions to our recommendations as well as  to the feedback from the firms 
are discussed below. 
On the issue of laboratory accreditation, LLDA admits that it is the EMB that 
recognizes results from accredited laboratories. LLDA accepts these results only insofar 
as the submission of the SMRs by firms is concerned. But when it comes to the   
issuance of discharge permits and clearances, the LLDA does not honor results from 
EMB-accredited laboratories. Instead, LLDA conducts a separate sampling and relies on 
its own laboratory test results. From the LLDA’s point of view, the purpose of the 
SMRs is merely to serve as an internal barometer of the firm that will guide them as to 
whether or not the quality of their wastewater discharge are within standard. The SMRs 
are used to compare the BOD loading of the firms as computed by LLDA with the 
values written in the SMRs. Should the SMR BOD loading be less than LLDA’s 
computed value, then the firms will have to pay the corresponding differential in the 
EUF due the following year. On the other hand, if the SMR BOD loading is greater than 
that assessed by LLDA, then the corresponding difference in EUF will be deducted 
from user fees due the following year. In response to the issue of firms often failing 
LLDA sampling tests, LLDA suggested that this differential could probably be due to a 
host of factors:  The dates when monitoring is done by LLDA and the firms are usually 
different and therefore this alone could already account for changes in effluent 
characteristics that eventually impact on the BOD level. At most, LLDA only monitors 
firms once every quarter. Cognizant of the fact that the characteristics of the effluent are 
highly changing, LLDA thus requires the firms to do self-monitoring activities for firms 
to be able to watch their environmental performance and be assured of compliance 
when the LLDA comes for a surprise inspection. So if the firms fail during inspections, 
LLDA conjectures that it could be because of troubles with their effluent on that 
particular day. A controversial insight was voiced out pertaining to the deliberate 
dilution of the split sample by some pollution control officers (PCOs) of the firms to 
make it appear that their wastewater sample passes the standard in order to avoid being 
reprimanded by their respective management. Thus, when LLDA laboratory staff 
performs its own analysis, the sample actually fails to meet the standard. 
On the 2
nd issue concerning alleged prolonged period before resampling, LLDA 
commented that the countdown for imposing the penalty of PHP1,000 per day of non-
compliance starts on the day that firms make a letter of request for resampling. LLDA 
counters that there are firms that already hand in such a request even just a day after the 
1
st actual sampling was done—and LLDA perceives this act as dubious because there is 
no way a firm can make technological and operational adjustments to improve its 
environmental performance in just one day! Nevertheless, in the event that a firm passes 
the standard after the resampling is done, then firms need not  pay the penalty; if it fails 
the resampling test, then the penalty of PHP1,000 per day is retroactive to the date that 
the request is made. LLDA management will sit and talk about the pros and cons of  
accreditation and/or expansion of laboratory services. 
On the 3
rd issue regarding provision by LLDA of valuable information on 
appropriate cost efficient technology for pollution abatement, LLDA said that its 
training module for the environment is good, but firms are hesitant to accept what they 
are teaching them. LLDA also claims that it does provide the firms with best practices 
and success stories as well as technical information on the appropriate technologies that 
may be used for pollution abatement. However, if what the firms actually want is for 




this because it will certainly be blamed should the suggested technology fail. LLDA has 
no hands-on  experience with various abatement technologies and is therefore not in the 
position to dictate what technology would work for a certain company. More 
importantly, it also perceives that patronizing a particular technology could likewise be 
a potential source of corruption. To date, and partly due to information derived from our 
presentations, LLDA mangement has initiated the listing down of technical consultants 
who can presumably be tapped to share information on cost efficient pollution 
abatement technology with regulated firms. 
On the 4
th issue concerning incentives, LLDA management will see what can be 
done. 
Regarding our suggestion of possibly reviewing and/or revising the EUF 
structure so that the fixed fees be reduced and the variable fees increased,  LLDA 
voiced out that  efforts are already being made toward this direction.  
In addition, the team also suggested that LLDA can come up with some sort of a 
sector-based computation of the EUF to at least give consideration to the differences in 
the nature of prodcution processes across subsectors that may likely put some sectors at 
a disadvantage. For instance, agricultural industries will discharge relatively higher 
amounts of BOD due to the naturally organic production process involved while the 
pulp and paper sub-sector as well as the garments and textile subsector may find it 
relatively more difficult and costly to significantly reduce volume of wastewater 
discharge because the production process inherently requires large volume of water, and 
consequently, higher volume of wastewater. LLDA replied that they have started 
implementing a similar ‘trial scheme’ with the fast food industries. Gasoline stations are 
making the same request for consideration.  
 
8.0 CONCLUSIONS AND ENTRY POINTS FOR POLICY INTERVENTION 
This study relied on several sources of information: a) a survey of 89 firms 
regularly monitored by the Laguna Lake Development Auhtority (LLDA) from 1999-
2004; b) 88 Non-surveyed and 89 Surveyed firms with self-monitoring reports (SMRs) 
for 2002 and environmental performance indicators for 1999-2004; and c)   
dissemination seminars for firms and the regulator. Hence, this concluding section is an 
integration of the insights from each of these sources. 
In general, the EUFS has been successful in inducing changes in pollution 
abatement behavior of firms. This is specifically reflected by the decreasing trends in 
the average EUF paid and variable fees as well as in BOD loading and concentration  
over the period 1999-2004. Moreover, the majority of firms, on average, have reduced 
the volume of wastewater discharges and wastewater treatment facilities have been 
installed although for one-third of the respondents, treatment facilities have been put up 
even before the EUFS implementation. Around 20-40% of firms have either reduced, 
substituted or eliminated harmful chemicals in response to the regulation. More 
importantly, 75%  of the sample firms are not simply complying with the standard of 50 





 Given the above findings, the good news is that firms have responded positively 
to the EUFS. But the bad news is, it is a very costly response that makes the regulated 
firms less competitive, among other things. There is reason to believe that compliance 
rates can be further improved and compliance costs can also be potentially reduced. 
While some firms seem to be still locked into a trial and error approach in determining 
the appropriate abatement technology that inevitably results to cost inefficiency and 
unnecessary waste of financial resources, other firms have overcome this technological 
information barrier. We have initially recommended that firms be more proactive and 
link up with research institutions to improve their monitoring capablilities and 
technological know-how. However, during the dissemination seminar, regulated firms 
voiced out their skepticism over this suggestion because past and present experience 
revealed that LLDA does not honor the test results of accredited laboratories other than 
its very own except for purposes of submitting the firms’ SMRs. This implies that 
LLDA also does not honor the effluent information on the firms’ SMRs for purposes of 
issuing discharge permits. LLDA’s argument is that differences in test results are bound 
to occur because a lot of factors can affect the characteristics of the effluent. For the 
past 9 years since the EUFS has been enforced, this lack or absence of trust between 
regulated firms and the regulator has persisted and it will continue to persist unless a 
potential resolution that is agreeable to both parties is arrived at. A possible entry point 
for policy intervention is to standardize and/or harmonize the laboratory procedures or 
processes for  handling and analyzing wastewater samples so it can pave the way for 
LLDA-accredited laboratory  firms whose test results will no longer be perceived as 
dubious by either party.  
In relation to the above, avenues for regular sharing of technical information on 
pollution abatement can be facilitated by LLDA since firms perceive that this 
information will greatly improve their environmental performance and at the same time 
cut on abatement costs
11.While trainings and seminars that include technical 
information on pollution abatement technology are already being conducted by LLDA, 
the fact that firms still raise this issue implies that the scope and scale of these trainings 
and seminars can be expanded. 
We have also initially suggested a possible review and revision of  the EUF 
since the current fixed fees seem to be giving the wrong signals to firms. Increasing the 
variable fee and reducing the fixed fees may encourage higher compliance rates. 
However,  LLDA said that efforts along this line are already under way, although 
nothing is definite yet.   
9.0 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As in any research that aims to perform robust statitical analysis, a large number 
of observations would be ideal. However, doing surveys is dependent on the willingness 
of  respondents to be part of the sample. In this study, we have gone to such great 
lengths and costs to enjoin firms to participate but we managed to cover only 89 firms. 
It would have been ideal to have surveyed all the 177 stand-alone industrial firms that 
were regularly monitored by LLDA from 1999 to 2004.  
                                                 
11 LLDA has initiated such a move with certain firms located in industrial parks and estates (Eco-Index) 





Areas for future research may include looking at marginal abatement costs 
(MAC) of firms and determining the factors affecting MAC. From the viewpoint of 
policymaking, information on firms’ MAC could be a valuable input in designing or 
revising user charges like the EUF. 
Information that will shed more light on the package of incentives that will 
enhance compliance rates among regulated firms may also be an important  research 
thrust. So will determining the factors that will induce regulated firms to truthfully 
reveal information in their self-monitoring reports (SMRs) as likewise suggested by 
Montenegro (2006) . 
  One of the main results of the study is the fact that firms, because of lack of 
access to appropriate technology (ies), are locked in a cycle of increasing investments 
on ineffective technologies in order to comply with standards. This result warrants 
further testing. One way to test this is to actually split the sample firms by technology 
categories. For example, engineering data on the type of technology they are currently 
using can be a means of classifying the firms according to the type of abatement 
technology. However, we currently do not have sufficient information in our survey 
data to be able to perform a more rigorous analysis on this. Future studies may want to 
include this as an item in their survey.  
 
An alternative would be to use technology dating as a rough measure of 
technology access. Firms will be classified according to the most recent date they have 
acquired their technology or invested in abatement technology. It is implicitly assumed 
that firms acquire the latest possible technology at the date of investment or acquisition. 
Furthermore, it is also assumed that older technology is less efficient than the latest 
technology. Once this is done, separate runs for firms in each category can be performed 
and the estimates or results compared for each category. If the costly investment loop 
hypothesis is robust then we would expect this relationship not to hold for firms who 
acquired abatement technologies at a later date. Differences in the number of firms in 
each category can however be a factor that can affect the analysis. That is differences in 
the estimates can be attributed more to the differences in sample sizes. To overcome this 
one can use “bootstrapping” procedures instead to generate the estimates from each 
category. 
 
Tempting as it is, these however cannot be done due to the very limited sample 
size we have. Splitting the sample further will reduce the degrees of freedom and thus 
the validity of the results. It is left to future researchers interested in the topic to further 
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Appendix Table 1.  Legal Pressure Index
12










Average EUF  0.775  0.639  0.335 0.311 
# of Cease and Desist 
Orders 
0.725  0.693  -0.281 -0.284 
# of Notice of violations  -0.006  -0.021  0.920 0.887 
 
Appendix Table 2.  Economic Pressure Index 






Sell products in the U.S.  0.877  0.380 
Sell products in Europe  0.858  0.372 
Sell products in Asia  0.816  0.354 
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Appendix Table 3.  Social Pressure Index 






# of Complaints  0.576  0.613 






Appendix Table 4.  Internal Pressure Index  










Year listed in any Foreign 
Stock Exchange 
0.839  0.513  0.116 -0.029 
# of plant employees  0.468  0.253  0.311 0.177 
Year listed in the Phil Stock 
Exchange 
0.839  0.534  -0.060 -0.168 
Company made profits in 
the last fiscal year 
0.153  -0.008  0.733 0.553 
Company has plants in other 
countries 
-0.004  -0.121  0.824 0.647 
 
 
Appendix Table 5. Involvement of Top Management in Environmental Issues 










Plant has a pro-active view 
of the environment 
0.948  0.314  -0.066  -0.033 
Plant's senior mgt. belief in 
envt'l protection 
0.933  0.308  0.022  -0.008 
Manager's performance 
review tied with waste mgt. 
performance 
0.930  0.306  0.056  0.023 
Rank of chairperson in 
Board of Directors Waste 
Management Comm. 
0.619  0.205  0.013  -0.007 
Presence of waste mgt 
committee in the Board of 
Directors 
-0.054 -0.040 0.770  0.682 
Company's senior manager's 
belief in env't protection 











Appendix Table 6. Integration Between Env’t Services and other Admin Units 















responsibilities due to waste 
mgt. system 
0.842  0.544  0.018 0.001 -0.040  -0.230 
Year waste mgt. policy was 
instituted 
0.783  0.438  0.072 0.053 0.247 -0.001 
Nature of contact with top 
mgt. 
0.296  0.185  -0.136 -0.100 0.017 -0.064 
Nature of contact with R 
and D dep't. 
0.011 0.033 0.808 0.570 -0.146  -0.076 
Year firm was registered as 
ISO 9000 company 
0.044  -0.162 -0.118 -0.051 0.800  0.574 
Year firm was registered as 
ISO 14000 company 
0.204 -0.067 0.045 0.065 0.820 0.557 
Existence of env't 
department 
-0.577 -0.275 -0.027 -0.029 -0.383 -0.146 
Nature of contact with 
engineering dep't 
-0.078  -0.078 0.844 0.606 0.080 0.113 
 
 
Appendix Table 7. Personnel Management and Environmental Issues 






Extent of personnel env't. 
training in the last 5 years 
0.825  0.371 
Extent of administrative 
employees' env't. training in 
the last 5 years 
0.770  0.347 
Extent of supervisor's env't. 
training in the last 5 years 
0.652  0.294 
# of hours of env't training 














Appendix Table 8. Physical and Financial Resources Allocated to Improving and 
Maintaining Environmental Performance 






Year primary waste treatment 
system was established 
0.790  0.404 
Year secondary waste treatment 
system was established 
0.729  0.373 
Year secondary effluent 
treatment system was 
established 
0.683  0.350 
Increased financial resources of 
env't. dep't. 




Appendix Table 9. Monitoring System and Activities 











with industry research 
centers 
0.957  0.323  0.078 0.010 
Firm owns a research centre 
or laboratory room 
0.952  0.321  0.077 0.010 
Collaborative monitoring 
with university research 
centers 
0.949  0.322  0.035 -0.024 
# of years doing monitoring 
or regular testing 
0.463  0.160  -0.034 -0.053 
# of waste audits in the past 
5 years 
0.132 0.003 0.771 0.614 













































































































































Appendix Figure 1c. Volume of Wastewater Discharge, Surveyed and Non-surveyed 
Firms, 1999-2004 
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Appendix Figure 1d. BOD Concentration, Surveyed and Non-surveyed Firms, 1999-
2004 































Appendix Figure 1e. BOD Compliance Rate, Surveyed and Non-surveyed Firms, 1999-
2004 
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